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This article examines the public policies determining the distribution of subsidized
housing in the Twin Cities metropolitan area of Minnesota, the resulting distribution of
subsidized housing, and the comparative costs associated with building in the region’s
central cities or in suburbs. The analysis concludes that current policies are clearly not
meeting the region’s responsibility to affirmatively further fair housing. The
metropolitan area abandoned its role as a national leader in this area decades ago.
The result is an affordable housing system that concentrates subsidized housing in the
region’s poorest and most segregated neighborhoods. This increases the concentration
of poverty in the two central cities, in the region’s most racially diverse neighborhoods,
and in the attendance areas of predominantly nonwhite schools. In the long run, this
hurts the regional economy and exacerbates the racial gaps in income, employment,
and student performance that plague the Twin Cities.
Keywords: low-income housing; minorities; community development; suburban
The Twin Cities metropolitan area of Minnesota is among the wealthiest and least diverse
in the United States, characteristics that once enabled the region to implement one of the
nation’s most integrative affordable housing programs. But in 1986, the cities abandoned
their ambitious, coordinated integration efforts. Affordable housing policy was turned
over to a loose network of regional, local, and private entities. The result has been a
reversal of the region’s previous integrative trends—and the growth of a large, hard-to-
regulate affordable housing industry.
Today, affordable housing policy in the Twin Cities actively contributes to deepening
segregation. Present-day regional subsidized housing construction has largely been
centered on building and rebuilding housing in the region’s poorest neighborhoods. While
this practice has been rationalized as a form of economic development, the evidence to
date suggests that these policies have intensified racial segregation and the concentration
of poverty.
This upswing in housing segregation has accompanied, and likely contributed to, other
segregative trends in the Twin Cities, most notably in education. In the 1970s and 1980s,
the region proactively pursued school integration, a policy lasting until the early 1990s, by
which time the region contained very few segregated schools. But this progress has been
reversed at an alarming pace. Today, over 130 of the region’s schools are segregated, and
racial isolation in schools mirrors residential segregation.
As a consequence of these policy changes, the Twin Cities region is unusually
segregated for an American city with its demographic characteristics. For instance, it is
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much more segregated than similarly composed cities such as Portland, Oregon, and
Seattle, Washington (Orfield & Luce, 2010). And the gap has worsened in recent years, as
the most deeply segregated neighborhoods of the Twin Cities have endured an unusually
harsh period of decline and disinvestment. Moreover, because many policymakers and
analysts have explicitly rejected the goals of racial integration, the region is unlikely to
change trajectory in the near future.
These broad segregative trends form the backdrop of other changes in the region’s
housing policy. Most notable is the emergence and preservation of a clear city–suburb
divide in affordable construction. In recent decades, the central cities ofMinneapolis and St.
Paul, despite containing most of the region’s low-income and minority population, have
captured a disproportionate share of subsidized housing funding. That this practice helps
perpetuate segregation is clear. Less obvious, however, is that it is inefficient. An analysis of
available data on affordable construction suggests that central city development programs
are comparatively expensive, with each new unit of urban affordable housing costing more
than an identical unit in a less segregated, more affluent, opportunity-rich suburb.
This wasteful approach to housing construction, in which public subsidies are
prioritized for central city projects, despite the fact that they return fewer units on the
dollar and create negative social externalities, has a number of root causes. In part, it has
arisen because the system by which affordable housing subsidies are distributed frequently
incentivizes and rewards developments in dense urban areas (and to some extent,
developments in segregated, relatively impoverished first-ring suburbs). It has also been
encouraged by the growth of a sophisticated “poverty housing” industry with a firm stake
in continued central city development. The industry incorporates a throng of government,
nonprofit, and for-profit entities, including a number of investors and intermediaries. For
some of these parties, affordable development is a highly profitable venture, facilitating
high salaries and lucrative investment strategies.
Proponents of this strategy argue that subsidizing housing in low-income
neighborhoods strengthens areas deprived of private credit. Most research, however,
contradicts this view. The most significant regional attempt to revitalize a neighborhood
through housing construction—the Franklin–Portland Gateway—is one of the most
expensive affordable housing projects in recent history and appears to have done little or
nothing to change its neighborhood’s downward trajectory.
In the meantime, potential projects in higher opportunity suburban areas have gone
unfunded. Affordable housing projects in these areas not only are much more cost
effective but can also reduce the concentration of poverty and provide the region’s low-
income citizens with greater access to better schools, safer neighborhoods, and more
economic opportunity.
Not only is this policy detrimental to the region, but it also violates federal law. The
Fair Housing Act requires recipients of housing dollars to affirmatively further fair
housing. Simply put, federal funding must be used on projects that encourage integration.
The region’s current subsidized housing strategies are clearly not meeting this
requirement.
In short, the failure of the Twin Cities to pursue housing integration in a coordinated
fashion has led to diffuse, decentralized affordable housing policy. A bevy of housing
subsidies with unaligned policy objectives, each awarded based on different rules,
frequently has the effect of rewarding central city developments. Meanwhile,
responsibility for subsidized construction is divided among heterogeneous organizations
pursuing a variety of interests and objectives. In these ways, regional authorities have
encouraged inefficient, wasteful construction in the central cities, while doing little to
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resolve fundamental problems like segregation and access to opportunity. Serious reforms
must be undertaken to address these concerns.
The Twin Cities Metropolitan Council and
the Requirements of the Federal Fair Housing Act
Housing policy tends to fall under two broad frameworks. One framework focuses
overwhelmingly on the production of units, using physical structures and the immediate
neighborhood as the focal points for analysis. This housing research tends to emphasize
the technical details of packaging, financing, and activities within the frame of single
neighborhood, rather than viewing a metropolitan area as an interconnected system.
Although these concerns are an important component of housing development, this
viewpoint is necessarily incomplete.
The second perspective conceptualizes housing more broadly: as a means of providing
access to desirable communities that offer strong opportunities for adults, foster the
development of children, and pose few threats to health and safety. It sees regional
housing policy as an interconnected system, where small changes can have broad effects
throughout a metropolitan area: strengthening or weakening neighborhoods by causing
population shifts, supporting or hindering cities in their bid to remain racially and socially
integrated, and making suburbs more or less competitive in the cost and provision of
services. This broader framework also views racial segregation and discrimination by
government, private firms, and individuals as central to housing policy. It is concerned
with the impact of residential segregation on local school quality, the metropolitan
dynamics of housing markets, and migration patterns for households of all races.
Put more succinctly, one framework views housing policy on a micro scale, as being
primarily a question of putting together funding and gaining access to sites, whereas the
other views housing policy on a macro scale, as being broadly related to the dynamics of
opportunity within metropolitan space.
Both Minnesota and federal law require that lawmakers and administrators incorporate
the second, regional perspective when determining housing policy. This is particularly true
with the effect of housing policy on racial segregation.
The Twin Cities Metropolitan Council (“Met Council”), in collaboration with the
Minnesota Housing Finance Agency (MHFA), has had the primary responsibility to
regulate and coordinate the placement of subsidized housing in the Twin Cities since its
inception, and the passage of the Minnesota Land Use Planning Act of 1976 strengthened
this obligation. The Met Council’s responsibilities under the Federal Fair Housing Act are
therefore an important overlay on any discussion of subsidized housing policy in the region.
According to Robert Freilich, the principal consultant retained to draft the Land Use
Planning Act,1 the Met Council’s housing program was shaped by the Gautreaux case in
Chicago, Illinois, and the Shannon case in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, both of which
involved remedies for federal civil rights laws violations involving governmental policies
that concentrated affordable housing in racially segregated or resegregating neighborhoods
(Freilich & Ragsdale, 1974b). In its guiding documents prior to the Land Use Planning
Act, the Met Council had declared that its fair share housing system was intended to
reduce racial and economic segregation and eliminate exclusionary zoning; it also declared
its intention to use its affirmative powers to increase regional racial and economic
integration for the benefits of individuals and neighborhoods, and to strengthen the region’s
workforce and economic vitality (Metropolitan Council of the Twin Cities Area, 1973).
M. Orfield et al.576
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The Federal Fair Housing Act declares that it shall be unlawful to make unavailable
or deny a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial
status, or national origin (Fair Housing Act of 1968). The federal rule implementing
this section states that a “practice has a discriminatory effect where it actually or
predictably . . . perpetuates segregated housing patterns because of race, color, religion, sex,
handicap, familial status, or national origin” (Fair HousingAct of 1968, 24C.F.R. § 100.500).
In Inclusive Communities Project v. Texas Department of Community Affairs, a federal court
in Texas recently found a “perpetuation of segregation” disparate impact violation of the Fair
Housing Act when the state housing agency disproportionately awarded low-income housing
tax credits in minority neighborhoods (Inclusive Communities Project v. Texas Department
of Community Affairs, 2010; Inclusive Communities Project v. Texas Department of
Community Affairs, 2012; Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dept. of Community Affairs, 2010).
Recipients of federal housing funds have an obligation under the Federal Fair Housing Act
to “affirmatively further” fair housing (Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d), 2013),
which requires them to use their “immense leverage” to create “integrated and balanced living
patterns” (NAACP v. Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, 2012). In its proposed
rule,which codifies existing case law, theU.S.Department ofHousing andUrbanDevelopment
(HUD) defines “affirmatively furthering fair housing” as “taking proactive steps beyond simply
combating discrimination to foster more inclusive communities.” Specifically, the proposed
rule states that affirmatively furthering fair housing“means taking steps toovercomesegregated
living patterns and support and promote integrated communities, [and] to end racially and
ethnically concentrated areas of poverty” (Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 2013).
Despite these clear responsibilities, Twin Cities governmental agencies and housing
developers frequently privilege the first, technically oriented policy framework over the
second, regionally oriented perspective. As the following analysis will show, the Met
Council’s broad powers are not utilized, and the Fair Housing Act’s requirements are
ignored, as affordable units are consistently placed in struggling neighborhoods with few
opportunities for residents.
Placement of Subsidized and LIHTC Housing Units in the Twin Cities
This section examines how subsidized housing is distributed across the Twin Cities
metropolitan area.2 The analysis uses data from HousingLink’s Streams data set, which
includes information for housing units receiving subsidies from nearly all public sources,
excluding in particular HUD’s Section 8 voucher program (HousingLink, 2013). The
locations of all subsidized units and units supported by the Low-Income Tax Housing
Credit (LIHTC) are broken out in three ways: by central cities and suburbs, by the racial
composition of the surrounding neighborhoods, and by the racial composition of the
elementary schools assigned to the units by school district attendance boundaries.
The central city–suburb comparison matters for a variety of reasons. First, the
complicated administrative structure that controls the regional distribution of large amounts
of subsidized housing divides the region thisway. LIHTC funding in themetropolitan area is
distributed through four “suballocators”—public entities designated by the State of
Minnesota to determine LIHTC allocations within their borders. Both of the central cities
are a suballocator in this system, along with Dakota County and Washington County.
MHFA allocates funds across the entire state, including to some projects within the
boundaries of the other suballocators. The central city–suburb comparison thus provides a
window into how the administrative structure affects the regional distribution of subsidized
housing. In addition, other funding streams often contribute to LIHTC projects and other
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programs (e.g., Section 8 vouchers) are affected by how LIHTC sites are spread across the
region, so the suballocator system has effects beyond LIHTC.
The region’s central cities are also crucial to the economic and social well-being of the
region. Minneapolis and St. Paul are already home to greatly disproportionate shares of the
region’s low-income population and people of color (Orfield & Luce, 2010). Job growth
also lags behind the suburbs in most years (Luce, Orfield, & Mazullo, 2006). Research
shows that cities and suburbs sink or swim together (Haughwout & Inman 2004:
Leichenko, 2001; Sole´-Olle´ & Viladecans-Marsal, 2004; Voith, 1998). A subsidized
housing system that concentrates poverty in the central cities and increases regional
segregation levels creates significant long-run costs for the region.
The composition of the neighborhoods where subsidized housing is located matters
because public agencies distributing housing subsidies are required by law to affirmatively
further fair housing. This means that public actors should not pursue policies that further
concentrate subsidized housing in neighborhoods that already contain disproportionate
shares of the region’s affordable housing stock and poor populations. Similarly, they
should not concentrate subsidized housing in ways that increase racial segregation in the
region’s neighborhoods.
The makeup of schools near subsidized housing matters because a large body of research
shows that a school’s poverty rate is the most powerful predictor of student performance and
that integrated schools are associated with better student performance for children of all
races (Institute on Race and Poverty, 2008, pp. 6–7). The Twin Cities consistently ranks at or
near the bottom of large U.S. metropolitan areas in the magnitude of racial achievement
gaps, regardless of the measures used to evaluate student performance. A distribution of
subsidized housing that provides the region’s children from low-income families with access
to low-poverty and racially integrated schools should therefore be a high priority.
Central Cities and Suburbs
Subsidized housing in theTwinCities is highly concentrated in the region’s two central cities.
In 2012, about 25% of the region’s population and housing units were located inMinneapolis
and St. Paul. However, more than twice this share of the region’s subsidized housing was
located there—59% of all subsidized units and 53% of LIHTC units (see Figure 1).
The distribution of subsidized housing within the central cities and across suburbs also
shows a distinct pattern (see Figure 2). In the central cities, subsidized units are highly
concentrated in neighborhoods along the I-94 corridor through central St. Paul and east-
central and northwest Minneapolis—the areas in those cities with high concentrations of
low-income people and people of color. Although subsidized units are more scattered in
Figure 1. Distribution of housing units in central cities and suburbs, 2012.
Note. LIHTC ¼ Low-Income Housing Tax Credit.
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the suburbs, the bulk of the units are in inner suburbs, near to the central cities—areas
which generally exhibit more poverty than other suburban areas and which are more likely
to be in racial transition.
Neighborhood Types
The distribution of subsidized housing across neighborhoods with different racial mixes
provides a window on how well the regional system has met its responsibility
Figure 2. Minneapolis–St. Paul,Minnesota, seven-county region:All subsidized housing by project
site in 2012.
Note. From HousingLink Streams 2012 subsidized housing data, NCompass street data, Minnesota Housing
Finance Agency subsidized housing data.
Housing Policy Debate 579
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to affirmatively further fair housing. By this criterion, an effective housing system should
not increase economic and racial segregation by concentrating subsidized housing in
nonwhite segregated neighborhoods—areas which are often already characterized by high
poverty and poor economic opportunities. Similarly, predominantly white neighbor-
hoods—areas which typically show the lowest crime rates, the strongest environmental
and health conditions, and the fastest-growing job markets—should not be under-
represented in subsidized housing markets. Finally, integrated, racially diverse areas are of
interest because these areas are often unstable—in the midst of rapid economic and/or
racial transition. Targeting these areas for subsidized housing development may further
destabilize them.
The data show very clearly that publicly subsidized housing is heavily concentrated in
areas that are already majority nonwhite. Further, racially diverse, integrated
neighborhoods—areas that are often very unstable and susceptible to economic
decline—are also home to disproportionate shares of subsidized housing. Despite the
fact that most of the region’s housing units are in predominantly white areas, subsidized
units are much more likely to be found in majority nonwhite or racially diverse areas. This
can be seen in two ways.
Figure 3 shows the percentage of the population that was nonwhite in census tracts across
the region. It is easy to see that racially diverse (20–50% nonwhite) and majority nonwhite
areas are distributed in much the same pattern as subsidized housing (see Figure 2). Majority
nonwhite neighborhoods follow the I-94 corridor through St. Paul and Minneapolis, just as
the subsidized units do. Racially diverse and majority nonwhite areas in the suburbs are also
concentrated in inner suburban areas, often mirroring the subsidized housing patterns in
Figure 2.
Tables 1 and 2 show the relationship more explicitly. In 2012, the share of all
subsidized housing units in majority nonwhite census tracts (33.3%) was more than 3
times greater than the percentage of all housing units in those areas (10.7%). Racially
diverse areas were also home to disproportionate shares of subsidized housing—44.5% of
the region’s subsidized units compared with just 33.6% of all housing units. In contrast,
predominantly white areas contained less than a fourth of all subsidized units, despite
containing more than half of all housing.
School Types
The makeup of the schools serving subsidized housing is an important indicator of the
opportunity structure available to housing residents. Highly segregated schools are also
nearly always high-poverty schools, and school poverty is a powerful predictor of
student performance. Racially integrated schools are of value in and of themselves as
well; integration is associated with better student performance for children of all races.
The Twin Cities’ consistently poor rank on racial disparities of all kinds, especially
student achievement, makes it doubly important to use all means available to reduce
disparities. Employing prointegrative strategies in the placement of subsidized housing
is one such tool.
Not surprisingly, comparing the distribution of subsidized housing with the
composition of elementary schools shows patterns much like the population data. Despite
the fact that the majority of all students in the region are located in areas with
predominantly white student populations in elementary schools, only about one-sixth of
subsidized units are in those areas (see Tables 3 and 4). This part of the region, of course, is
where educational opportunities are strongest for the most part, where crime is lowest,
M. Orfield et al.580
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where environmental and health conditions are strongest, and where jobs are growing most
quickly. The lack of housing in these areas that is affordable for lower income households
shuts off long-run opportunities to low-income children of color, contributing to the
region’s enormous racial gaps in educational performance.
Table 1. Twin Cities, Minnesota, seven-county area number of total subsidized, Low-Income
Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC), and housing units by percentage minority in census tracts.
Share of minority in tract Subsidized units LIHTC units Total units Renter units
0–19% 13,296 3,143 620,429 111,015
20–29% 13,571 3,868 238,646 82,431
30–49% 13,131 3,481 134,306 62,802
50–100% 19,950 4,100 118,685 64,347
Total 59,948 14,592 1,112,066 320,595
Note. Data from HousingLink (2012 subsidized unit data), U.S. Census Bureau (2010 census tract race data).
Figure 3. Percentage minority population by census tract, 2010.
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Reflecting this pattern, nearly 60% of subsidized units are in attendance boundaries for
majority nonwhite schools, even though those areas have less than a fourth of all students in
the region. These areas are home to the greatest concentrations of lower performing schools.
Attendance boundaries for integrated schools—those with 30–50% nonwhite
students—contain a proportionate share of subsidized housing. Roughly a fourth of the
region’s subsidized housing is in these areas, reflecting their share of the elementary
student population. This positive result is tempered by the fact that like neighborhoods
with similar compositions, many of these schools are actually in racial and economic
transition. Although integrated in 2012, these schools can be very unstable, meaning that it
is inadvisable to add more subsidized housing in these areas.
Figure 4 shows the attendance boundaries of elementary schools in the region, divided
into three categories: predominantly white (schools with nonwhite shares between 0 and
30%), integrated (nonwhite shares between 30% and 50%), andmajority nonwhite (nonwhite
shares greater than 50%). A comparison with Figure 2 shows how closely subsidized housing
patterns mirror the distribution of predominantly nonwhite and integrated schools.
Table 2. Twin Cities,Minnesota, seven-county area share of total subsidized, Low-IncomeHousing
Tax Credit (LIHTC), and housing units by percentage minority in census tracts, 2005–2011.
Share of minority in tract Subsidized units LIHTC units Total units Renter units
0–19% 22.2 21.5 55.8 34.6
20–29% 22.6 26.5 21.5 25.7
30–49% 21.9 23.9 12.1 19.6
50–100% 33.3 28.1 10.6 20.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total metro sum 59,948 14,592 1,112,066 320,595
Note. Data from HousingLink (2012 subsidized unit data), U.S. Census Bureau (2010 census tract race data).
Table 3. Twin Cities, Minnesota, seven-county area number of total subsidized, Low-Income
Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) units, and students by percentage minority in elementary school
attendance areas.
Share of minority in area Subsidized units LIHTC units Student population
0–29% 9,356 2,416 100,980
30–49% 15,806 3,970 43,407
50–100% 34,786 8,126 43,666
Total 59,948 14,512 188,053
Note.Data fromHousingLink (2012 subsidizedunit data),MinnesotaDepartmentofEducation (2013 school racedata).
Table 4. Twin Cities, Minnesota, seven-county area share of total subsidized, Low-Income
Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) units, and students by percentage minority in elementary school
attendance areas.
Share of minority in area Subsidized units LIHTC units Student population
0–29% 15.6 16.6 53.7
30–49% 26.4 27.4 23.1
50–100% 58.0 56.0 23.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total metro sum 59,948 14,512 188,053
Note. Data from HousingLink (2012 subsidized unit data), Minnesota Department of Education (2013 school race
data).
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Recent Patterns of MHFA LIHTC Allocations
A great deal of the imbalance in the distribution of subsidized housing is due to the
disproportionate share of subsidized housing in the two central cities. Data shortcomings
make it difficult to see if recent funding patterns have improved or worsened the
imbalance. Data showing recent LIHTC awards are limited largely to projects with
MHFA participation (Minnesota Housing Finance Agency, 2005–2013). Data are not
available for some projects awarded solely by the cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul. The
two central cities distribute roughly a third of the region’s LIHTC funding in their roles as
suballocators. Projects with some degree of MHFA participation are counted in the figures
below. However, some projects receiving LIHTC funding from suballocators may not be
included in the MHFA reports. Nonetheless, the available data show a greatly
disproportionate share of LIHTC funding going to sites in Minneapolis and St. Paul;
because the central cities are the largest suballocators, more accurate data would almost
certainly increase their total share of LIHTC funding.
Figure 4. Racial composition of public elementary schools by school attendance areas, 2012–2013.
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TheLIHTCallocationdata show that the percentageofLIHTCawardsgoing to the central
cities, measured in dollars, hovered near 40% from 2005 to 2009, rose to 50% in 2010, and
dropped slightly to the mid- to low-40% range from 2011 to 2013 (see Figure 5). Although
these shares (which understate the actual distribution of all LIHTC funds to the central cities)
are lower than the share of LIHTC units shown in Figure 1, they still indicate that a
disproportionate amount of LIHTC funding is going to central city locations. The two central
cities were home to less than 24% of the region’s population during this period but received
42% of the tax credit funding during the period. Between 2005 and 2013, $23 million of
fundingwent to the central cities, resulting inover 1,200newLIHTCunits, often in segregated
neighborhoods. At the same time, the state rejected about $33 million worth of requests from
suburban areas—places more likely to have higher achieving and more integrated schools.
The Costs of Subsidized Housing in the Central Cities and Suburbs
The two central cities are home to disproportionate shares of the regional pool of
subsidized housing. Together, Minneapolis and St. Paul contain 59% of the region’s
subsidized housing, compared with only 25% of all housing units (and an even smaller
share of the population).
Although this unbalanced distribution concentrates poverty and increases racial
segregation, one possible defense is that it also provides more bang for the buck by focusing
funding in lower cost areas, thereby maximizing the regional total of affordable housing
units generated by limited funds. Similarly, if it is cheaper to build affordable housing in the
cities and the award process rewards lower costs, then the application process might create
an advantage for projects in city locations. This section evaluates and rejects that argument,
determining that per-unit total development costs are significantly higher in the central
cities. It also explores some possible explanations for these higher costs.
Costs of Subsidized Housing Construction
Data for 166 MHFA-funded projects involving new construction of subsidized housing
between 1999 and 2013 show that it is more expensive to construct subsidized housing in
Figure 5. Central city Low-IncomeHousing Tax Credit (LIHTC) and population shares, 2005–2013.
Note. Population estimates shownare frompopulation estimates providedby theMetCouncil, available at http://stats.
metc.state.mn.us/data_download/DD_start.aspx.
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Minneapolis or St. Paul than elsewhere in the metropolitan area.3 This conclusion is drawn
from a statistical model built from MHFA data, HousingLink’s Streams data set, and
various other sources. The analysis controls for building characteristics and a number of
other project attributes that could affect costs. The results imply that, all else being equal,
it costs significantly more to construct new subsidized housing units in the central cities
than in the rest of the region—$30,000 more per housing unit in Minneapolis and $37,900
more in St. Paul. These amounts represent 14% and 18%, respectively, of the regional
average cost per unit of constructing new subsidized housing during this period.
Table 5 shows the characteristics of new construction projects in the Twin Cities
region between 1999 and 2013 for the region as a whole, the two central cities, and the
suburbs. The data set includes cost and other information for the 166 new construction
projects reported by MHFA for that period. The simple cost data show that the region-wide
average cost per housing unit (in 2012 dollars) was $209,334. Projects located in
Minneapolis and St. Paul show substantially higher costs per unit—$227,660 in
Minneapolis and $224,157 in St. Paul—while those in the suburbs were less expensive at
$194,174. However, the simple averages do not reflect other characteristics of the projects
and the sites that could affect costs, perhaps enough to reverse the conclusion that projects
in the central cities are more expensive.
First, and most obviously, cost is heavily impacted by the characteristics of the units in
question. If the central cities were building larger units—or perhaps targeting slightly
higher income residents—then one might expect different construction costs. As it turns
out, the opposite was occurring: Central city units are disproportionately efficiencies or
one-bedroom, while suburban units are more likely to contain two or three bedrooms.
Higher shares of central city units also tended to be affordable at lower incomes.
Another possible explanation for higher costs in the cities is commercial space. City
developments were in fact more likely to be mixed-use, with commercial space intended
for retail or offices. This space is theoretically eligible for fewer public dollars than
housing, but even mixed-use developments tend to be very heavily publicly subsidized.
Similarly, city projects were more likely to include land acquisition costs, demolition
costs, or historic buildings—all factors that could increase costs.
Other factors may impact costs but have less predictable effects on the city–suburb
cost comparison. These include the percentage of units to be rented at market rents,
whether the project includes some rehabilitation of existing units, the number of buildings,
the number of units per building, and whether the project includes LIHTC funding.
The statistical model (see Table 6) includes all of the above factors and demonstrates that
many do in fact affect per-unit costs. However, controlling for these characteristics actually
results in awider cost gap between central cities and suburbs than in the simple averages.After
accounting for all of these factors, the gap nearly doubles to $30,000 forMinneapolis andmore
than doubles to $37,900 for St. Paul. Indeed, a location in Minneapolis or St. Paul remains
among the most important of all the factors affecting costs per unit.
The large cost effect of a central city location is rivaled in the results only by whether
the project included LIHTC funding, the number of units per building, the percentage of
units that are market rate, whether land acquisition was required, and whether the project
includes high percentages of large (three- or four-bedroom) units.4 That site and unit
characteristics are important is not surprising. The large effect for LIHTC funding—all
else being equal, projects with LIHTC funding had costs $40,660 higher per unit—is less
easy to explain. It is not simply an effect of public funding because all projects in the data
set received some amount of public money. It could represent higher costs caused by red
tape (if LIHTC is more heavily regulated than other funding sources) or those caused by
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less strict rules about how to spend the money (if LIHTC is less heavily regulated than
other funding sources). In either case, it is a finding worthy of further research.
The actual cost discrepancy may be even greater than indicated by the statistical
analysis because it could be argued that the model controls for characteristics that should
be omitted as policy variables. Building size and composition are as much a function of a
development’s geographic location as they are a discretionary choice of the developer.
Likewise, if historic preservation and other project characteristics drive up costs, this may
form part of the case against city building. Nonetheless, the model errs on the side of
caution by including these factors; despite this, the cost disparity remains.
The econometric model only incorporates characteristics of the developments in
question. If the full cost difference between city and suburb cannot be predicted by looking
at what is being built, the gap must be the result of how projects are being built or funded
or who is building them.
It is possible that construction costs in the cities are higher because of the relative
difficulty of building large developments in a densely populated area. These costs can
arise from a number of sources. Land suitable for development is scarcer in the cities and
therefore likely costs more aswell. (Note, however, that the land for affordable developments
is not always acquired at market price and is often in low-cost, high-poverty neighborhoods.)
Additionally, other costs associated with construction might be higher in central city
locations; for instance, sites might be more difficult to access or might require additional
Table 6. Regression results: Determinants of per-unit cost of Low-Income Housing Tax Credit
(LIHTC) affordable housing projects (2012 $).
Standardized
Variable Coefficient t statistic coefficient
Minneapolis location 30,025 3.56a 0.28
St. Paul location 37,903 3.36a 0.27
Percentage of units:
1 bedroom 142 0.89 0.07
2 bedrooms 304 1.74a 0.14
3 bedrooms 467 2.37a 0.20
4 bedrooms 1,979 3.34a 0.22
Percentage of units affordable at:
50% of regional median income 25 20.04 0.00
60% of regional median income 2149 21.27 20.11
80% of regional median income 2330 20.63 20.04
Percentage of units market rate 556 3.20a 0.26
Land acquisition included 27,366 3.44a 0.25
Demolition required 4,758 0.57 0.04
Historic building(s) involved 65,223 1.92b 0.18
Rehabilitation of existing unit 29,009 20.73 20.05
Conversion 223,378 20.85 20.09
Nonresidential development (sq. ft. per res.) 27 0.68 0.05
Nonresidential development included (sq. ft.) 1,070 0.08 0.01
Units per building 2363 23.32a 20.30
Number of buildings 21,409 21.52 20.12
LIHTC included 40,661 4.33a 0.33
Constant 140,095 11.20a 0.00
Adjusted R 2 0.46
N 163
aCoefficient significant at 95% confidence level. bCoefficient significant at 90% confidence level. Weighted least
squares: weight ¼ total units.
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safety measures. If building is on or near a former industrial site, pollution cleanup could be
required before development can begin. Last but hardly least, the cities might more strictly
regulate construction and development. Traffic studies, pollution studies and environmental
certifications, historic preservation rules—all increase the expense of building.
With more extensive data, it may be possible to incorporate some of these factors into
the regressionmodel. This, however, poses a number of technical difficulties—for instance,
affordable developers frequently pay below-market price for land acquisition—and would
in any case undermine the model’s analytic purpose, which is not to isolate every specific
factor that could account for project cost differentials. Instead, the model is meant to
demonstrate cost differences between otherwise identical construction projects being built
in different locations. Characteristics of the locations themselvesmust therefore be omitted.
The other notable feature of affordable housing development in the central cities is the
number of private firms and interest groups with a hand in its creation. While housing
construction in the suburbs is frequently managed by county development agencies, the
cities are home to a large network of heterogeneous organizations, all with a role in the
process. This could work to raise costs in several ways, particularly if the housing industry
is able to exert influence on government funding sources. First, some groups may directly
benefit from increased spending in the housing sector—particularly public spending, some
of which is little more than free money for developers. Another, more subtle mechanism
by which interest groups increase costs is by promoting projects without regard to cost
efficiency. For instance, while developing in a particular neighborhood may be expensive,
a community development corporation based in that neighborhood creates a political
constituency for development activity focused in that neighborhood. These development
constituencies are not necessarily geographic; for instance, some of the largest
development organizations in the Twin Cities focus on housing for recovering addicts. Nor
are they necessarily private. Minneapolis’s Department of Community Planning and
Economic Development is far larger, better funded, and better organized than its suburban
equivalents; it has the clout to substantially increase development within the city.
Because of their number and complexity, determining which of these factors is
primarily responsible for the cost difference between cities and suburbs is impossible
without better data. Indeed, it is unlikely that one single explanation exists; instead, some
combination of the above factors probably contributes to the higher cost of affordable
housing construction in the cities.
Nonetheless, the available data are sufficient to determine that affordable housing
supply is not especially responsive to cost. The emphasis on expensive city building over
cheaper suburban building suggests that the amount of construction is not strongly impacted
by small marginal increases or decreases in unit cost. Of course, some of this is by design.
Cost effectiveness is not the primary goal of affordable housing construction; rather,
affordable housing fills a range of needs that the private housing market has failed to
provide. But, all else being equal, increased cost effectiveness would allow more bang for
the public’s buck. What’s more, unresponsiveness to cost helps demonstrate defects in the
affordable housing market—defects that have deepened as the affordable housing funding
has become more tangled and the development community has fragmented.
The Twin Cities Development Community
One potential explanation for the higher cost of affordable housing in the central cities is
the number of private firms and interest groups with a hand in its creation. Affordable
development in the metro area (and especially in the central cities) is dominated by a web
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of sundry developers, community development corporations, investors, and financial
professionals, many of which exhibit a preference for projects in urban areas. The large
number of participants helps draw public funds into the development apparatus while
complicating any attempt to align funding with discernible policy goals. Moreover, the
size and scope of the Twin Cities affordable housing community, combined with
the necessity that it interact closely and frequently with the public agencies that provide
the bulk of funding, creates a significant risk of regulatory capture, in which the
community’s (central city oriented) development priorities are imposed on or adopted by
policymakers themselves.
The central role of this industry in affordable construction calls for further analysis.
Analyzing community developers, however, poses a difficulty: There is no truly
“typical” organization. Instead, the industry is composed of many heterogeneous firms.
At present, the Metropolitan Consortium of Community Developers (MCCD), which
includes almost all the major players in the Twin Cities housing nonprofit scene, has 49
members, which range from tiny community groups to large nonprofits with yearly
revenues in the tens of millions of dollars. Some organizations such as Twin Cities
Habitat for Humanity, are affiliated with larger national groups, while others are closely
associated with for-profit companies. Activities run the gamut as well: Large
developers are able to independently conduct most development, while neighborhood
groups are forced to partner with builders, architects, financiers, and each other.
Housing Nonprofit Financial Overview
The affordable housing industry in the Twin Cities region is quite expansive and
commands considerable financial resources. In 2011, the last year for which data are
available, MCCD members had combined expenses of $178,111,075. Although the sector
includes dozens of organizations, its resources, particularly in terms of raw spending and
revenue, are concentrated in the hands of a relatively few large institutions. The activities
of just eight of the 49 member organizations accounted for $110,193,034, or nearly 62%,
of total spending. These organizations were Aeon, Artspace, Twin Cities Habitat for
Humanity, RS Eden (a nonprofit building supportive housing for substance abuse victims),
Commonbond, the Greater Metropolitan Housing Corporation, Project for Pride in Living,
and the Community Housing Development Corporation, each with more than $10 million
in expenses.5
By comparison, the expenditures of small neighborhood development corporations,
which usually operate within a single neighborhood, are much lower. For example, 17
organizations spent under a million dollars in 2011, accounting for less than 5% of total
spending.
MCCD members derived the largest share of their 2011 revenue from program
services, earning $90,318,705. Coming next, private contributions provided $52,288,626
in funding. Finally, governments granted $46,719,761 to MCCD members.
Nearly 90% of reported MCCD expenses go to program services, with the remainder
spent on administration and fund-raising. Approximately 30% of total expenses are in the
form of employee compensation. However, both of these figures, and particularly
compensation, vary widely between organizations.
There appears to be little relationship between an organization’s reported financial
characteristics and the amount of government grant money it receives. The percentage of
total revenue accounted for by grants varies widely among organizations, both large and
small, ranging from nothing or a few percentages to nearly the entirety of an organization’s
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yearly income. Nor does an organization’s size (in assets or in members) seem to correlate
well with the percentage revenue received through grants. Among the eight highest
spending organizations, for instance, the Greater Metropolitan Housing Corporation
received $5,233,407, while CommonBond received a comparatively meager $690,000 in
grants. And smaller nonprofits frequently received large sums: for instance, Dayton’s
Bluff Neighborhood Housing Services ($2,834,567), Emerge Community Development
($2,942,801), and the Hmong American Partnership ($3,440,103).
Unsurprisingly, executive compensation appears to be associated with an
organization’s size. Of the “Big Eight” organizations that account for most expenses,
seven also have the highest paid chief officers of MCCD member organizations, with
yearly salaries ranging from $144,056 to $207,200. (The eighth member of the Big Eight
comes in 10th, paying its president $123,861.) In general, heading up a housing nonprofit
appears to be fairly lucrative, with only eight organizations paying their chief executives
less than $50,000 a year. (Compensation may be higher than it appears, even in those
organizations, because at least one of these is overseen by the chief executive officer of a
Minneapolis for-profit developer. It is possible that the leadership of other MCCD
members also includes for-profit business owners.)
There is one area in which clear distinctions among organizations emerge, however:
program services expenditures and revenues. While most MCCD members’ expenses are
largely dedicated to program services, that proportion tends to increase in organizations
with more assets. Furthermore, larger organizations derive a significantly higher
percentage of their revenue from program services.6
The rather strong association between an organization’s size and its programs’
finances suggests that MCCD’s large nonprofits operate more efficiently and in a manner
more akin to for-profit enterprises. They draw large amounts of their funding from service
fees and cover the gap between revenues with grants and contributions, while smaller
organizations tend to fund more of their activities directly out of grants and contributions
(see Figure 6). This distinction may also represent the large organizations’ tendency to
participate in stable, ongoing arrangements which they are successfully able to
monetize—for instance, participating in continuous housing development for fees—
instead of a selection of relatively heterogeneous activities, primarily linked by their
geographic focus. Some scholars have argued that Community Development Corporations
(CDCs) perform a dual role as technical specialists and neighborhood advocates (Goetz &
Figure 6. Percentage of revenue and expenses from program services, Metropolitan Consortium of
Community Developers members (2011).
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Sidney 1995); these figures complicate that picture, suggesting that larger CDCs tend to be
somewhat more oriented toward technical and development work, while smaller CDCs
may be somewhat more oriented toward political advocacy.
Affordable Housing Financial Intermediaries:
Local Initiatives Support Corporation and Family Housing Fund
The aforementioned statistics only include community developers, who are perhaps the
most visible members of the affordable housing community. However, affordable
development also relies on financial intermediaries—organizations that frequently exceed
the developers in size and influence. These entities, frequently nonprofits as well, provide
coordination, technical assistance, and loans and grants to housing projects, helping
developers cover funding gaps and navigate the complexities of the financing process.
In essence, they fill a market niche created by the complexity of the affordable housing
system, bringing together the vast number of government and private entities that
participate financially in the construction of a single housing project.
Family Housing Fund is one notable local housing intermediary, comparable in size to
the larger local developers (e.g., Aeon, Community Housing Development Corporation).
In 2011, it maintained assets of $72,156,907 and liabilities of $34,384,044. Its expenses,
$10,554,586, significantly exceeded its income of $6,414,242. As with for-profit financial
firms, its executives are well compensated, with its president receiving $173,159 and its
vice president getting $139,495.
Family Housing Fund represents a convergence of the public and private sectors in
affordable housing; it was founded in 1980 as a collaboration between the cities of
Minneapolis and St. Paul. Given these origins, it is perhaps unsurprising that the
organization is disproportionately focused on the two central cities. For the first decade of
its existence, the fund explicitly focused its efforts within the cities, contributing 10,500
low-income units to Minneapolis and St. Paul. In the following years, it expanded both its
geographic scope and its program activities, inaugurating a series of programs designed to
expand access to housing and reduce homelessness. Although some of these efforts are
directed into the suburbs, a wildly disproportionate amount of the organization’s resources
is still expended in the central cities: MHFA records show that the intermediary
contributed over $15 million to new affordable development from 1999 to 2013,
approximately $9 million of which was to projects in Minneapolis and St. Paul.
Expenditures alone understate the organization’s real influence over housing
development. As one of the best-funded affordable housing entities in the Twin Cities, with
substantial financial expertise at its disposal, Family Housing Fund also plays an important
role in directing policy. It maintains leadership roles in a number of important regional
projects: for instance, Corridors of Opportunity, which focuses on revitalizing distressed
neighborhoods (primarily in the central cities); the Minnesota Preservation Plus Initiative,
which seeks to maintain the existing housing stock; and the Central Corridor Funders
Collaborative, a project helping guide investment along the Twin Cities’ new light rail line.
Family Housing Fund also has created several major subsidiaries. In 1986, it organized
the Twin Cities Housing Development Corporation, an entity charged with the direct
development of affordable housing. More recently, the fund has created the Twin Cities
Community Land Bank, which fills a variety of roles as a financial intermediary in its own
right. In addition to making loans and otherwise providing financing, the land bank works
directly with private banks to acquire foreclosed properties for conversion into affordable
units, usually by transferring the property into the portfolio of a community developer.
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These activities are sharply focused within the City of Minneapolis, particularly in the
heavily distressed North neighborhood, which was devastated by the foreclosure crisis.7
But even the largest Minnesota organizations are dwarfed by national nonprofit
housing intermediaries. One of the largest national players in affordable housing financing
is Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC), which is headquartered in New York. It is
comparable in size to a significant national financial firm, with assets totaling
$440,406,573 in 2011 and an income of $149,668,788. Its size is reflected in its payroll:
The same year, LISC paid out $5,299,110 in salary, with its president receiving $408,432.
LISC maintains a Minnesota subsidiary, Twin Cities Local Initiatives Support
Corporation (TC LISC). Like Family Housing Fund, TC LISC plays a major role in policy
development—even serving as a partner on almost the exact same set of local initiatives.
This is not as strange as it may first seem: The lists of board members and organizational
partners for Twin Cities affordable development collaborations are frequently near carbon
copies of one another, as a handful of major organizations—the aforementioned largest
CDCs, and the largest financial intermediaries—take a leading role in almost every
venture.
Public–Private Interactions in the Affordable Housing Industry
Affordable developers’ ability to obtain public funding, despite pursuing projects with a
high per-unit cost, suggests that there may be some degree of regulatory capture in the
affordable housing industry. Regulatory capture can be a complex phenomenon. Contrary
to popular belief, capture does not mean that government and industry are engaging in any
sort of corrupt activity or quid pro quo. Instead, a governmental agency can be captured if
it develops a highly collaborative relationship with regulated entities, such that it begins to
see its interests and the industry’s as parallel. While a good working relationship with
private industry can be beneficial, it can also prove corrosive to the public interest. This is
because agencies and private firms that are too closely tied together are less likely to take
antagonistic positions or question the assumptions undergirding the industry’s activities,
even when doing so would ultimately serve larger policy goals.
Capture is more likely in highly technical fields, where regulators and industry
members must share the same narrow expertise. As a result, both groups frequently
contain members with similar professional and educational backgrounds, and there is a
higher probability of a revolving door developing, where industry members are selected
for government positions, and former government workers enter the industry they once
regulated. Capture is also more plausible in situations where there is frequent contact
between regulators and private institutions, as participants see greater benefit in
maintaining harmonious relationships and pursuing common goals.
Twin Cities affordable housing development easily satisfies these conditions. It boasts
an extremely complex financial backend, which can only be navigated by technically
proficient financial professionals. (In the words of one Minnesota Housing staff member,
“Nobody really understands this stuff except the developers and underwriters.”)
Affordable developers—and, therefore, housing policymakers—also must possess the
considerable engineering and planning expertise required to site and design a large
multiunit building in a dense urban environment. As the technical complexity of
development has increased, and financial and development specialists have come to
dominate local and state housing agencies, “housing policy” has been increasingly defined
by a focus on relative minutiae related to project funding, permitting, and construction.
By contrast, questions of a broader scope—for instance, siting trends, neighborhood
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effects, and preferences for cities or suburbs—rarely appear in policy documents and are
almost never thoroughly analyzed in connection to individual projects. The proliferation
of technical specialists within public agencies seems to have encouraged the view that the
agencies should not play any role as prescriptive policymakers or address any matter that
cannot be resolved by reference to industry specialists.
In addition, the affordable housing industry relies heavily on repeat players. Almost all
local affordable projects include the participation of one (or more) of a small handful of
very active housing nonprofits, which usually possess years or decades of experience
working in the same communities and with the same government funding sources. Many
of these institutions are run by individuals with former careers in government housing
agencies; likewise, many positions in local governmental bodies are filled by alumni of the
affordable housing industry. (Most notably, the current appointed chair of the Met Council
has remained in her position as the head of the local branch of Habitat of Humanity while
at the council.) Consequently, policymakers working in affordable housing are frequently
navigating the well-worn grooves of long-standing relationships. Nor is there much
incentive to closely interrogate or disrupt these arrangements, as doing so would make life
more difficult for all involved.
In some instances, the line between public and private in affordable housing has almost
completely dissolved. For instance, the aforementioned Family Housing Fund was created
in 1980 by the cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul; to this day, neighborhood advocates have
expressed confusion about whether its employees are public servants. (In most of its public
materials, the fund is referred to as a nonprofit.) The same ambiguity extends to its
subsidiaries; for instance, the Twin Cities Housing Development Corporation was
described by local media as “quasipublic” upon its creation but today also bills itself as
merely a nonprofit (Sundstrom, 1986). If, how, and when these organizations transitioned
from public to private entities is unclear. Nonetheless, the Family Housing Fund is treated
as a public agency in at least one important step in the affordable development process:
Minnesota Housing conducts a consolidated request for proposals (also known as the
“Super RFP”) in which potential developers can simultaneously request funding from a
number of public entities, including MHFA, the central cities housing agencies, the Met
Council—and the Family Housing Fund.
Elsewhere, governments and nonprofits are layered so closely into collaborative
projects that it becomes difficult to distinguish where one ends and the other begins.
Initiatives surrounding the recent Green Line light rail, which runs between the two central
cities, illustrate the problem. The regional Met Council created the Corridors of
Opportunity, a partnership designed to, in its own words, “accelerate the build out of a
regional transit system for the Twin Cities in ways that would advance economic
development.” Corridors of Opportunity (2014), which has heavily focused its efforts on
the Green Line central corridor, includes on its leadership team executives from the Met
Council, TC LISC, and the central city housing agencies Project for Pride in Living, the
MCCD, the Family Housing Fund, and the Twin Cities Community Land Bank, among
others. Meanwhile, a private funding collaborative, the Central Corridor Funders
Collaborative, was also created to spur development along the Green Line. But this
initiative includes nearly the same set of local housing players as the Corridors of
Opportunity: TC LISC, the Twin Cities Community Land Bank, the Project for Pride and
Living, the Met Council, the housing agencies, and the Family Housing Fund.
These initiatives’ work thus far has ably demonstrated the perils of densely
intermingled public–private interactions: The Funders Collaborative helped create a
recommendation that 4,500 affordable units be constructed or preserved along the Green
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Line, after which Corridors of Opportunity and the Funders Collaborative routed millions
of dollars of funding into affordable projects in this area. And, recently, the Funders
Collaborative produced a report lauding the cities’ progress toward its goal. Lost among
this whirlwind of collaboration was the fact that much of the progress has been made by
placing thousands of units in a handful of heavily segregated census tracts, one of which is
the state’s second-poorest by median income.
Other Factors Leading to Greater Spending in Central Cities
This section explores two other features of the subsidized housing sector that contribute to
the central city focus of regional spending: the system and criteria used to select projects
for public funding, particularly low-income housing tax credits, and the use of subsidized
housing as a means of boosting neighborhood economic development.
Project Selection
Funding for affordable housing is provided by a complex web of public and private
agencies and through a variety of financial vehicles. The best-known and most influential
of these is LIHTC, allocated to the states by the federal government and to developers by a
series of suballocators. In the Twin Cities, the largest suballocators are MHFA,
Minneapolis, and St. Paul. In addition, a variety of other local entities receive a portion of
tax credits, including Dakota County and some municipalities.
Public agencies also provide funding to developers through a range of different direct
loans and grants. Public money is sometimes augmented with private grants, which usually
works their way through a network of nonprofits. Frequently, private grants originate from
organizations that themselves received significant contributions of public money; at least
some part of these private grants represents indirect public contributions. Finally, of
course, some purely private investment capital is spent on developing low-cost units,
although the layering of funding mechanisms tends to obscure the exact size of the private
contribution.
One explanation for why affordable housing construction focuses on the central cities
despite higher costs is because funding allocators deemphasize project cost. Tax credit
allocations take cost into consideration, but LIHTC projects are evaluated by point-based
allocative systems that give more emphasis to a welter of other factors. Other sources of
funding seem to function in a similar fashion. In addition, money is frequently allocated to
geographic areas, which prevents lower cost projects from outcompeting high-cost
projects, to the extent that lower cost projects are outside prioritized funding areas.
Another important consideration is the way in which the allocation process shields
geographic shares of LIHTC funding from competitive pressure. The suballocator system
ensures that the vast majority of central city allocations cannot be diverted to the suburbs,
no matter how much cheaper it is to pursue suburban development. Nonetheless, other
factors must also be at play, as the Washington and Dakota suballocators do not appear to
encourage similarly high costs.
How the LIHTC Works
LIHTC allocation is complex. Minnesota splits its federal LIHTC allocation three ways.
First, 10% is removed from the total as a nonprofit set-aside, as required by federal law.
The remainder is split into two regional allocations: a metropolitan pool and a greater
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Minnesota pool. The share of each pool is determined by a formula specified by state law.
Currently, the metropolitan area receives 62% of the state’s total allocation.
The determination of which projects receive LIHTC allocations is independent of the
determination of the number of credits that will be allocated. As a result, a particularly
expensive project, requiring a large number of credits, is not necessarily at a disadvantage
when compared with a cheaper project.
Suballocators. While MHFA is the state’s primary agency for administering LIHTC, state
law allows local housing authorities to serve as suballocators of tax credits (Minn. Stat.
462A.222). Projects applying for tax credits within the geographic jurisdiction of a
suballocator are expected to seek credits through the suballocator instead of through
MHFA (with one important exception in the nonprofit set-aside, discussed below).
Suballocators also develop their own Qualified Allocation Plans for selecting tax credit
recipients, giving them discretion to pursue local priorities. Each suballocator maintains
its own competitive round, meaning that applications within a particular jurisdiction only
compete with other applications within that jurisdiction.
Today, there are four suballocators drawing from the metropolitan pool: Minneapolis,
St. Paul, Washington County, and Dakota County. Minneapolis and St. Paul have jointly
developed a Qualified Allocation Plan governing their allocation process and designated
their respective housing agencies as the recipients of their tax credit shares. They do not,
however, jointly evaluate project proposals; each city maintains an independent
competitive round.
Minnesota state law does not specify any particular formula for distributing tax credits
from the metropolitan pool to these suballocators. Instead, it instructs the Met Council to
develop and submit a plan toMinnesotaHousing for allocating tax credits, “based on regional
needs and priorities.” The statute also gives Minnesota Housing authority to “amend the
distribution plan after consultation with the Metropolitan Council, representatives of local
governments, andhousing and redevelopment authorities” (MinnesotaStatute462A.222 subd
4). In other words, the statute instructs that suballocator shares will be determined by a
collaborative effort between theMetCouncil andMinnesotaHousing, and grants each agency
significant discretionary authority over the final distribution.
Unfortunately, at present, the Met Council’s distribution plan does not appear to be
publicly available, nor has the agency yet responded to inquiries about the plan or its
development. However, it is possible to determine the shares themselves by looking at
Minnesota Housing’s annual distribution projections, which specifies how many tax
credits it expects to be available in each pool and to each suballocator. In 2015, 20.4% and
15.2% of the metropolitan pool’s total tax credits were allocated to the Minneapolis and St.
Paul suballocators, respectively.
As previouslymentioned, 10% of the annual federal tax credits are placed into a nonprofit
set-aside. The set-aside is administered by MHFA, which chooses to divide it between the
metropolitan area and greaterMinnesota in the same proportion as the other funds.Because of
this practice, 62% of the set-aside—6.2% of the state’s LIHTC funding—is earmarked for
metro area nonprofits. This 6.2% is governed byMHFA’s point system and can be allocated
anywhere in the metro region, even within a suballocator’s jurisdiction.
Proposal Grading System. Federal law requires that developments meet one of two criteria
to qualify for tax credits: Either (1) 20% or more of a development’s units must be rent
restricted and occupied by families below 50% of the region’s average median income, or
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(2) 40% or more of a development’s units must be rent restricted and occupied by families
below 60% of the region’s average median income. Confusingly, this multidimensional
standard incorporates local average incomes, the relative number of units provided, the
actual rents on those units, the actual occupancy of those units, and the actual incomes of
the occupants (Iglesias & Lento, 2011).
Projects that meet these criteria are chosen for tax credit allocations in a competitive
process, the particulars of which are governed by the suballocating agency. In Minnesota,
projects are assigned points based on their characteristics; proposals with more points are
given priority over proposals with fewer points. The point system is the suballocator’s
most direct means of incentivizing certain types of affordable housing construction and
prioritizing particular policy goals (MHFA, 2013).
To qualify for tax credits, projects must score at least 30 points. However, each year,
developments seek far more credits than are available. Because most developments
depend on credits for a substantial portion, and often the majority, of their funding,
developers have a strong incentive to maximize the number of points scored and therefore
their chances of receiving adequate funding (Iglesias & Lento, 2011).
The number of tax credits a project receives is determined by the project’s
characteristics, not the competitive point process. A handful of points is available for more
cost-efficient projects; outside of those, a project cannot increase its chances of receiving
tax credits by cutting costs. The formula for the number of credits allocated takes into
account a range of different factors and incorporates multiple, shifting standards. The
number of tax credits provided also varies with the number of affordable units included in
the project, of course.
Determining eligibility is only the first step. In order to calculate the actual number of
credits allocated, allocators must also determine the project’s eligible basis, which
includes most costs of construction but omits certain expenses, such as land costs. Tax
credits are then assigned to cover a certain percentage of the eligible basis. The percentage
varies based on whether the project is rehabilitating an existing unit or constructing a new
unit; the former qualifies for tax credits covering 30% of the project’s cost, while the latter
qualifies for credits covering 70%. Additionally, a certain number of credits is set aside to
be allocated to nonprofit organizations. Finally, projects to be constructed in “qualified
census tracts (QCTs) or difficult development areas (DDAs), determined by HUD on a
yearly basis, are allowed to increase their eligible basis by up to 30% (Iglesias & Lento,
2011).
Further confusing the matter is the process of actually generating capital from tax
credits. A given dollar value of credits does not translate directly into the same amount of
cash for a developer. Instead, a tax credit entitles the holder to deduct that amount from its
taxes for 10 years. Thus, $10 in credits can potentially reduce the holder’s tax bill by $100
over a decade. But the present value to a holder might be markedly less than $100. This is
both because simply multiplying the allocation by 10 ignores the reduced future value of
money and because uncertainty about future events introduces an element of risk into the
credit grantee’s expected returns. Two major risks include the project owner’s ability to
ensure the project remains qualified for credits for the following decade and that the tax
credits available in a given year could exceed the applicable tax burden, meaning that
some go to waste (Iglesias & Lento, 2011).
This complicated structure has produced an equally complicated financial back end.
Because a project’s backers will rarely generate enough taxable income to make full use of
the credits, credits are usually distributed by forming a partnership or limited liability
corporation with for-profit investors. (This unusual arrangement is necessary to comply
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with the requirements of federal tax law.) The developer or tax credit recipient becomes
the general partner, and the investors join as limited partners. The limited partners invest
capital into the partnership—effectively the “price” being paid for the tax credits—and
receive a 99.99% share of profits generated, thus transferring the benefit of the tax credits
from the recipient to investors. This process is collectively known as syndication (Iglesias
& Lento, 2011).
Effects of Suballocator and Point Systems on Project Placement and Characteristics. The
suballocator shares serve, in effect, as a tax credit funding floor for the central cities. In the
coming year, 35.6% of the metropolitan tax credit pool is effectively earmarked for use by
the two central cities, which only contain 23% of the metropolitan population. In addition,
MHFA can, at its discretion, make geographically unrestricted allocations from the 10%
nonprofit set-aside. Since 2005, the central cities have received an average of 42% of all
metro area LIHTC funding. This suggests that in addition to their suballocator shares, the
central cities are receiving most of the set-aside.
Beyond simply overallocating funding to the central cities, this systemmay create greater
incentives for developers to propose central city projects. Developers have an incentive to
minimize competition for tax credits. Developers who apply for tax credits from the
suballocators are only required to outscore rival projects in the same geographic jurisdiction,
and are therefore exposed to less competitive pressure. In addition, the nonprofit set-aside
allows nonprofit developers to apply jointly for MHFA and suballocator credits but only so
long as they are developing a project within a suballocator’s jurisdiction. This dual eligibility
further increases the attractiveness of central city projects.
The point system for allocating tax credits among different projects also has a clear
potential to affect the characteristics of project proposals. As the primary suballocator in
the state of Minnesota, MHFA’s point system represents a particularly influential set of
policy priorities.
MHFA assigns a relatively large number of points to projects targeting certain
populations. Ten points are given to projects in which 75% of the units contain two or more
bedrooms and are prioritized for families with children; alternatively, a project is assigned
10 points if 50% or more of its units are single-bedroom and affordable at 30% of the area
median income. Obviously, these two conditions are mutually exclusive. Another 10 points
are available to projects for which 50% of the units are set aside for special populations,
often meaning residents with disabilities or drug dependencies. The prevalence of larger
units in the suburbs and smaller units in the central cities suggests that suburban developers
have availed themselves of the first criteria while urban developers have relied upon the
second. One potential explanation for this trend is the higher cost of developing in the cities:
Since the points awarded are the same in either case, developers facing higher costsmight be
more likely to rely on the route that allows them to build smaller units (MHFA, 2013).
Ten points are also awarded for units that rehabilitate existing structures, and an
additional 2 points if the rehabilitation is part of a community stabilization plan. If a
project involves new construction, 10 points are only available if it will not require a
substantial extension of existing utility lines. This criterion also significantly favors urban
developers, who have a larger number of existing structures to choose from and,
presumably, a more thorough network of utilities to draw upon (MHFA, 2013).
Five points are given to projects in or near top growth communities, where MHFA has
determined that rapid job growth has created extra housing demand. In 2013, Minneapolis
was included in these communities. Once again, this seems to advantage Minneapolis
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developers, particularly in conjunction with the point allotment for new construction
relying on existing utilities. In smaller, thriving cities, land with existing utility
connections might be subject to higher competing demands; in comparison, Minneapolis’s
larger geographic area gives developers more opportunity to obtain the top growth
community points while building on relatively cheap, previously developed land (MHFA,
2013).
A heavy emphasis is placed on providing housing to combat long-term homelessness.
Project proposals that meet certain conditions related to providing permanent housing for
the homeless receive 100 bonus points, until $1,795,000 in tax credits are exhausted.
Afterward, projects can earn up to 10 points for setting aside 50% or more of their units for
long-term homelessness; even projects that only set aside 5–10% of their units can earn 5
extra points. Many affordable housing developments include a smattering of units targeted
for the long-term homeless; this provision probably explains why. It also likely advantages
developments in areas that suffer from higher rates of homelessness and disadvantages
developments appropriate primarily for lower income families (MHFA, 2013).
Three points are available for projects with access to mass transit. Once again, this
advantages proposals in regions with dense mass transit near land available for
development (MHFA, 2013).
Comparatively few points are awarded to projects on the basis of cost effectiveness.
Up to 6 points are available, on a sliding scale, for projects that keep soft costs down. Up to
20 points can be earned by projects that are fully funded or have a large percentage of their
funding secured; this does not directly address the issue of cost but might provide an
advantage to cheaper developments, which are presumably easier to fund. And up to 10
points are given to proposals that receive some percentage of their funding from other
government contributions—a factor which may or may not favor lower cost projects
(MHFA, 2013).
Finally, it is worth noting that economic integration of affordable housing projects
appears to be an extremely low priority, at least as reflected by the point system.
Developments with between 25% and 50% affordable units—in other words,
developments that mix lower income and middle or higher income populations—are
eligible for a meager 2 points. Projects located in higher income communities are also
eligible for just 2 points. Notably, the point system allows applicants to count only one of
these two sources, even if both apply. For comparison, a developer can also earn 2 points
by providing high-speed Internet access and declaring its building smoke-free. Developers
looking to maximize their chance of being awarded tax credits face no real incentive to
consider economic integration (MHFA, 2013).
Other aspects of the LIHTC system can also influence the placement and composition
of developments. In particular, the public–private financing system and syndication have
the potential to add new dimensions to the construction of affordable housing, by adding a
set of investment conditions and constraints to housing projects that are often difficult to
predict. One such constraint is the developer’s bureaucratic intelligence, as an
organization with expertise and experience in setting up the financial infrastructure for
housing might have a substantial advantage over a developer who is merely a competent
builder. Syndication also subjects developers and credit allocators to new pressures. For
instance, investors regularly demand financial commitments from the housing project
owner (which may endanger its nonprofit status, if it exists). A project that is depreciating
and running at a loss may allow further tax write-offs, to the delight of investors, although
probably not to occupants seeking long-term housing (Clarke, 2012).
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Perhaps even more importantly, syndication drags a number of third parties into the
affordable housing market—parties who often have a very limited interest in actually
providing housing. These include not only the private investors but also specialized
coordinators, or syndicators. These additional participants may have incentives that are at
odds with the housing objectives of the tax credit grant. For example, if tax credits, for
whatever reason, are a particularly profitable investment in some circumstances, then
investors and syndicators might especially support projects that maximize the allocation of
tax credits. Placing projects in lower income QCTs and DDAs helps accomplish this end,
as does building projects in which 100% of the units are affordable.
Other components of the LIHTC system suggest additional reasons for the
emphasis on development in the central cities. Even absent investor pressure, the tax
credit bonus provided to QCTs or DDAs provides a higher incentive for urban developers
to focus on acquiring tax credits. Studies have shown that housing construction is
disproportionately encouraged by the bonus, and high-density QCTs or DDAs are
primarily found in the cities (Baum-Snow & Marion, 2009).
Subsidized Housing as Economic Development Policy
Deficiencies in the private credit market underlie one common argument in favor of
subsidized development in low-income neighborhoods. According to some advocates of
central city development, low-income areas that fail to attract private lending can be
revitalized by public lending for the purposes of building low-income housing.
Unfortunately, while ameliorating the effects of unfair lending is an attractive policy
goal, research shows that affordable housing generally fails to revitalize stricken
neighborhoods. Indeed, development often has a negative effect, as these neighborhoods
are frequently at high risk of racial or economic transition and are among the most likely to
be adversely affected by the addition of subsidized housing (Institute on Race and Poverty,
2009; Orfield & Luce, 2013). For instance, Galster’s (2004) literature review concluded
that neighborhood characteristics influence how subsidized housing affects surrounding
areas and that there is growing evidence that neighborhoods with moderate home values
and poverty rates are at greater risk of experiencing negative effects, even at lower
concentrations of affordable or multifamily housing. Galster also concluded that
“affordable housing seems least likely to generate negative impacts when it is inserted into
high-value, low-poverty, stable neighborhoods” (p. 200). Similarly, a literature review by
Abt Associates concluded that the effect of subsidized housing on nearby properties
appears to depend on the scale of the project and the stability of the neighborhood
(Khadduri, Burnett, & Rodda, 2003). A small project in a stable neighborhood has either
no effect or a small positive effect. In contrast, a project added to an unstable
neighborhood, especially a large project, can either cause a decline in property values or
prevent revitalization that would otherwise occur as a result of market forces (Khadduri
et al., 2003, pp. 41, 63).
These trends are in evidence in the Twin Cities. The new consolidated plan for the City
of Minneapolis, for instance, expands the neighborhoods eligible for subsidized housing to
include census tracts with minority shares between 29% and 50%, potentially intensifying
the city’s pattern of racial segregation. As the following case study will demonstrate, huge
amounts of public funding are poured into large housing developments in these low-
income, segregated areas. But there is little evidence of the predicted economic boost that
would make such projects worthwhile.
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East Phillips, Minneapolis: Franklin–Portland Gateway Development
An informal survey of the leading community development organizations in the region
was conducted, requesting examples of a low-income housing project that had revitalized
a neighborhood. Very few examples were forthcoming. However, the City of Minneapolis,
the private nonprofit developer involved with the project, and the Minnesota Housing
Partnership all pointed to the Franklin–Gateway Project as an example of such a project.
There was no other project with a similar level of response.
The Franklin–Portland Gateway, also known as the South Quarter, demonstrates
how considerable resources, including LIHTC, are used to build subsidized housing
in racially segregated, inner cities. (Figure 7 shows the location of the project and
highlights the nearby neighborhoods covered by Table 7.) Located in the
northwest portion of Minneapolis’s Phillips neighborhood on four blocks surrounding
the intersection of Franklin and Portland Avenues, the Gateway is one of the most
expensive affordable housing developments in the region. According to MHFA data on
funding streams, total development costs for the four buildings included in the project
exceeded $66 million: $9,816,165 for the Children’s Village Center, completed in
2004; $9,549,952 for the Jourdain building, completed in 2006; $13,216,898 for the
Figure 7. Franklin–Portland Gateway.
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Wellstone building, completed in 2008; and, finally, $33,899,340 for Phase IV, which is
still under development.8
The $32.5 million spent so far has produced 126 units of new housing, 97 of which are
affordable. Unusual for a central city project, many of these units are geared toward
families, with 74 containing two or more bedrooms. Plans for Phase IV include an
additional 120 units, almost all of which are to be affordable. However, history gives some
cause for caution: In the earlier phases, the number of units and the percentage of
affordable units were adjusted downward as construction progressed.
The project is not dedicated solely to housing. The existing buildings contain
approximately 8,500 square feet of rentable commercial space and about 2,700 square feet
dedicated to tenant community space.9 They also contain an office complex for Hope
Community, the CDC responsible for orchestrating the development. This may help
explain the relatively high costs associated with the project, which ranged from $259,857
to $340,849 per housing unit (in 2012 dollars) for the four phases. However, the
multivariate statistical analysis described above and shown in Table 6 implies that the
addition of commercial space does not add very much to the average per-unit development
costs.
Like virtually every modern affordable housing development, the Franklin–Portland
project relies on a complex mix of funding. The project has drawn from, or plans to draw
from, over two dozen different funding sources, including federal, state, county, and city
programs that provide grants and interest-free loans, private grant-writing foundations
(which in turn receive public money), charitable contributions, and a small portion of
private developer capital. A brief overview of these funding sources provides a window
into the byzantine world of affordable housing financing, where a dizzying collection of
Table 7. Race and economics of the Gateway neighborhood, Minneapolis, and the Twin Cities
metropolitan area.
Percentage race and ethnicity in 2010
Gatewaya Minneapolis Metro
White 26.9 60.3 78.6
Black 40.1 18.3 7.3
American Indian 3.4 1.7 0.6
Asian 1.7 5.6 5.7
Hispanic or Latino 23.1 10.5 5.4
All others 4.9 3.7 2.4
Population 3,198 382,578 3,279,833
Median household income ($) 21,757 47,478 66,157
Percentage below the poverty line 44.6 22.3 9.9
Percentage labor force participation 68.2 73.0 73.2
Median sales 2010 through October 2013 ($)
Single-family homes 125,000 195,000 n/a
Duplexes/triplexes 144,000 172,528 n/a
Condos/co-ops 123,000 213,000 n/a
Apartments (per foot) 37.8 59.2 n/a
Commercial (per foot) 69.8 63.9 n/a
Note. Data from U.S. Bureau of the Census (2000 and 2010 Census of Population, 2007–11 American
Community Survey), City of Minneapolis (property sales data).
aGateway includes all of Ventura Village andWest Phillips neighborhood for sales data and Census Tract 59.02 in
Minneapolis for U.S. Census data.
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programs (almost invariably assigned an opaque acronymic title) are mined for
construction capital. The end result is a confusing alphabet soup that effectively obscures
many of the incentives faced by housing developers.
The most significant single source of funding for the project, by far, is the LIHTC.
Syndication of tax credits is responsible for $14.6 million of funding for the existing
buildings and is planned to provide another $12.2 million for Phase IV.
The remaining costs are covered by a diverse array of programs. For Phase II, the
developers received a $3.2 million federally insured Section 221(d)4 mortgage from HUD;
Phase IV will incorporate another $9.1 million federally insured mortgage. Phase I was
awarded a $1.9 million loan from MHFA’s Minnesota Families Affordable Rental
Investment Fund program. Approximately $3.2 million in loans were also received from
the City of Minneapolis, with at least some of these traveling through the Affordable
Housing Trust Fund program. Through its Livable Community Demonstration Account,
the Minneapolis Community Development Agency provided $1.2 million to the first three
phases and is slated to give $790,000 to Phase IV. The agency also awarded Phase I a
$400,000 Community Development Block Grant and a $305,000 HOME Investment
Partnerships Program (HOME) loan. Another $2 million is expected to come through
MHFA’s Economic Development and Housing Challenge program, and Phase III was
selected for a $185,000 loan from the agency’s Housing Trust Fund for Ending Long-Term
Homelessness. Hennepin County has contributed approximately $2 million through a
smattering of loan programs. The nonprofit affordable housing financier Family Housing
Fund loaned the project $890,000, some portion of which was presumably granted to the
fund by government entities. Phases I and II received $225,000 from the HUD
Empowerment Zone initiative, which helped fund projects in designated geographic
zones. (Conveniently, three corners of the Franklin–Portland intersection fall into these
zones. The corner that does not is the location of Phase IV, which was delayed until after
the Empowerment Zone program expired in 2011.10) Finally, a variety of other private and
nonprofit entities provided the remaining moneys.
As is the norm with affordable housing development, public agencies ultimately pick
up most of the tab. Of the $32.5 million spent on the first three phases, only somewhere
between $2.7 and $6.1 million (8–19%) is from purely private sources. Similar figures are
expected for Phase IV, which expects to raise from private sources only $6.2 million of its
$33.9 million price tag.
Proponents of the Gateway argue that the development will bring viability to an
economically struggling and undercapitalized area and that it will be a catalyst for further
development in the area (Aeon, 2013; Gilyard, 2011; Olson, 2013). However, although the
development has replaced many dilapidated structures that surrounded the intersection,
there is no evidence that the Gateway has revitalized the surrounding area in a significant
way. In fact, the area has fared much worse over the last 10 years than the city and region
as a whole.
Tables 7 and 8 show racial and economic trends over the last 10 years in the area
surrounding the Gateway development. As of 2010, the census tract containing the
Gateway (the dark gray area in Figure 7) has a population that is 73% people of color, a
decline of 7 percentage points since 2000. While population was essentially stable in the
City of Minneapolis between 2000 and 2010 (and growing 10% in the metro area overall),
the Gateway’s population declined by 3.3%.
This area compares poorly economically as well. The median household income is
$21,757, less than half that of the City of Minneapolis, which is $47,478 and only one-
third the income level of the metropolitan area as a whole, which is $66,157. During the
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2000s, household incomes rose 25% in the City of Minneapolis and 22% in the metro area
but only 5% in the census tract containing the Gateway.11
TheGateway tract also has a very high poverty rate of 44.6%, double that ofMinneapolis
and more than 4 times that of the metro area, and the area’s poverty rate increased by 2.5
percentage points in the 2000s. Labor force participation is just 68% in the neighborhood,
lower than either Minneapolis or the metro area (both at 73%), although participation rates
increased more during the period in the Gateway tract than in the city or the region.
Property sales prices are also lower andhavedroppedmoredramatically inneighborhoods
that surround the Gateway than in the city as a whole. Data from the Minneapolis City
Assessor’s Office show that since 2010, all property sales values (except commercial) are
significantly lower in the Gateway neighborhoods than in the city overall (see Table 6).
There are enormous differences between the Gateway area and Minneapolis when it
comes to sales price changes between the prerecession (2002–2005) and the postrecession
(2010–2013) periods (see Table 7). Single-family property prices dropped 31% in the
Gateway area, while they increased 1% in Minneapolis; sales prices for condos/co-ops
dropped 36% while climbing 2% in Minneapolis; apartment (per square foot) prices
declined twice as much and commercial (per square foot) prices 4 times as much in the
Gateway as prices in Minneapolis; and, finally, duplex/triplex property sales declined in
the Gateway by 39% and in Minneapolis by 30%.
Comparing the socioeconomic outcomes of the neighborhood surrounding the
Gateway with other similarly situated neighborhoods (rather than to the City of
Minneapolis and the region) changes very little. The comparison uses neighborhoods east
Table 8. Change in race and economics of the Gateway neighborhood, Minneapolis, and the Twin
Cities metropolitan area.
2000 to 2010 Point change
Gatewaya Minneapolis Metro
White 7.4 22.2 26.1
Black 4.1 0.5 2.0
American Indian 22.8 20.3 20.1
Asian 21.5 20.5 1.6
Hispanic or Latino 22.4 2.8 2.0
All others 24.8 20.3 0.5
2000 to 2010 Percentage change
Population 23.3 0.0 10.5
Median household income ($) 4.9 25.4 21.8
2000 to 2010 Point change
Percentage below the poverty line 2.5 5.4 3.2
Percentage labor force participation 16.0 25.0 0.6
2002–05 to 2010–13 sales % change
Single-family homes 231.3 1.0 n/a
Duplexes/triplexes 238.7 230.2 n/a
Condos/co-ops 235.8 2.1 n/a
Apartments (per foot) 237.8 216.2 n/a
Note. Data from U.S. Bureau of the Census (2000 and 2010 Census of Population, 2007–11 American
Community Survey), City of Minneapolis (property sales data).
aGateway includes all of Ventura Village andWest Phillips neighborhood for sales data and Census Tract 59.02 in
Minneapolis for U.S. Census data.
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and south of the Gateway (East Phillips, Phillips West, Midtown Phillips, East Ventura
Village, East Phillips, Cedar Riverside, East Stevens Square, and North Whittier) and in
North Minneapolis (Harrison, Near North–South, and Near North–North). Table 9 shows
the Gateway neighborhood with typical values on most measures both at the beginning of
the period (2000) and in changes during the subsequent decade, despite the enormous
investments that occurred during the period.
Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
The public policies determining the distribution of subsidized housing in the Twin Cities
are clearly not meeting the region’s responsibility to affirmatively further fair housing.
The metropolitan area abandoned its role as a national leader in this area decades ago. The
result is an affordable housing system that concentrates subsidized housing in the region’s
poorest and most segregated neighborhoods. This increases the concentration of poverty in
the two central cities, in the region’s most racially diverse neighborhoods, and in the
attendance areas of predominantly nonwhite schools. In the long run, this hurts the
regional economy and exacerbates the racial gaps in income, employment, and student
performance that plague the Twin Cities.
There are a variety of possible responses that could put the region back on track:
† The suballocator system that arbitrarily distributes a disproportionate share of the
region’s tax credits to the two central cities should be abandoned so all potential
projects compete on equal footing for tax credits, or MHFA and the Met Council
should adjust the central cities’ share to reflect their share of regional population.
† The point system used to evaluate tax credit proposals should be redesigned
to greatly increase the values given to cost effectiveness, strategies promoting
economic and racial integration, and access to educational opportunities.
† Every possible means should be pursued to guarantee that all parts of the region
contribute their fair share of affordable housing (subsidized or not) to the regional
housing market. This means, in particular, that the Met Council should use all of its
powers to ensure that affordable housing is located to enhance access to all types of
Table 9. Race and economics in neighborhoods similar to the Gateway in Minneapolis 2000, and
change from 2000 to 2010.
2000 2000–2010 change
12-neighborhood 12-neighborhood
Gateway average Gateway average
Percentage white 20 30 7 0
Percentage black 36 34 4 3
Percentage American Indian 6 6 23 22
Percentage Asian 3 10 22 23
Percentage Hispanic 25 14 22 3
Percentage all others 35 21 27 1
Population 3,307 4,328 23 25
Median household income 21,601 22,316 13 11
Percentage below the poverty line 42 33 5 9
Percentage labor force participation 52 60 16 7
Percentage homeownership 10 23 0 21
Vacancy rate 5 6 5 6
Note. Data from U.S. Bureau of the Census (2000 and 2010 Census of Population, 2007–11 American
Community Survey).
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opportunities for households at all income levels. It also means that areas that are
currently economically and racially diverse should not be overburdened, putting
them at risk of rapid transition.
† The metro area should pursue a regionalized system to distribute Section 8 vouchers.
If the current system (which allocates vouchers to several agencies) remains, then the
portability of all vouchers from one agency to another should be required.
† All possible actions should be taken to ensure that Section 8 vouchers are redeemable
in all parts of the region, particularly in high-opportunity areas where this is currently
not the case.
† Finally, and perhaps most importantly, federal, state, and regional resources for
policies designed to improve economic and social conditions in the region’s poorest
neighborhoods over the long term should be increased dramatically. These include,
for instance, programs to create living wage jobs, better access to high-performing
schools, and safer streets. The current lack of such funding in these areas creates the
cutthroat competition by central cities for the only significant funding sources left—
those for subsidized housing—despite the fact that any economic development
benefits of such spending (if they even exist) are short-lived and come with clear
long-term costs in the form of greater concentrations of poverty.
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Notes
1. See Freilich and Ragsdale (1974a). The report was later published in the Minnesota Law
Review (Freilich & Ragsdale, 1974b) with the following note: “This article is the result of a
1971–73 grant from the Met Council to Professor Freilich to study and recommend a legal
policy for regional growth in accordance with the council’s decision to pursue growth in a
timed and sequential manner” (p. 1009).
2. For the purposes of this work, the Twin Cities metropolitan area is defined as the region’s seven
central counties: Anoka, Carver, Dakota, Hennepin, Ramsey, Scott, and Washington counties.
The HousingLink data set is limited to these counties, which contain the overwhelming
majority of subsidized housing in the official 13-county metropolitan area.
3. The analysis is for new construction only. An effective model of costs for rehabilitation
projects would be impossible with the available data given how varied these projects are. The
cost data are based on budgeted costs, and the data set was edited to exclude duplicated records
resulting from revised budgets. In the case of duplicates, the most recent entry was used. The
resulting sample of 166 projects is meant to capture all new construction projects that received
MHFA funding. Cost data include total development costs—funding from all sources,
including non-MHFA public funding and private money. The sample includes projects that
received LIHTC funding only fromMHFA as well as projects that received LIHTC funds from
both MHFA and another regional suballocator. See Other Factors Leading to Greater Spending
in Central Cities for a description of the suballocator system.
4. This comparison is based on standardized coefficients shown in Table 6. Only the LIHTC and
units per building coefficients exceed theMinneapolis and St. Paul coefficients (in absolute value).
5. Nonprofit financial data are drawn from the Form 990s Aeon, Artspace, Twin Cities Habitat for
Humanity, RS Eden, Commonbond, the Greater Metropolitan Housing Corporation, Project for
Pride in Living, and the Community Housing Development Corporation for the year 2011,
available at www.guidestar.com.
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6. This correlation is statistically significant at a 99% confidence level.
7. See Loan & Acquisition Map, Twin Cities Community Land Bank, http://www.tcclandbank.
org/downloads/Map-Property-Acquisition-and-Loans.pdf.
8. All information on project costs and funding in the Franklin–Portland development is
collected from a spreadsheet of proposed funding sources provided by MHFA.
9. Information about the Franklin–Portland Gateway is from the City of Minneapolis Community
Planning and Economic Development. http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/cped/projects/cped_
franklin_portland_gateway, last accessed 12/5/2013.
10. See the HUD Empowerment Zone locator, available at http://egis.hud.gov/ezrclocator/.
11. Income growth rates were not adjusted for inflation.
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